I Have Smallpox Now...

Rome wasn't built in a day. This is one of the many unnecessary lessons I learned today while waiting in endless lines to become "deployable." Did the construction of Rome have anything to do with what I did today? No. An emphatic hell no. But still, let's remember that Roman engineering was not sophisticated enough to build the aqueducts, coliseum and various government buildings within a 24-hour period. Because before today I really thought it had been...

The Army classifies Soldiers as either "deployable" or "non-deployable." It is an evolving classification that every Soldier is required to have at all times. To become deployable, Soldiers have to endure a bevy of shots (anthrax and smallpox being the worst) and even more mental evaluations, blood screenings, and various administrative paperwork. This all takes place at the Soldier Readiness Center, or SRC. (Sidenote: Fort Hood's SRC is infamous for the massacre which took place there at the hands of Major Nidal Hassan in November 2009. Because of the horrible actions done by the hands of an incredibly deranged and mentally unstable sociopath, the security at the SRC and its satellite locations is intense: metal detectors, gun-carrying guards and few entrances. The amount of care Fort Hood has taken to prevent such a horrible act from happening again is immense and, across the board, well-received. I am not complaining about the security and the lines it causes, nor am I complaining about the decision to separate the buildings at which Soldiers process though SRC.)

Our SRC is staffed by friendly - if not completely competent - Soldiers and civilians. It is in two places: one for shots and clinical evaluations, one for more administrative reasons: wills, financial matters, etc. There are fifteen stations through which Soldiers need to process, and at any given time those fifteen stations are staffed by maybe four to five people. On the surface this seems like a good ratio; in practice each station can handle four people, so maybe 60 people are serviced at different stations at any given time. My Troop has 85 Soldiers, so... well I am not good with math but it shouldn't need to take more than an hour for each unit to process through. Good job, Fort Hood. However - there's always a however - I seem to remember some expression about well-laid plans not being worth a crap. So, if you know that expression (I clearly don't) insert it here.

My Troop went through SRC in early December. Most of my Soldiers, after about 6-8 hours, were declared "deployable." I was not. I went though all fifteen stations and was "cleared" - declared deployable - at thirteen of them, but eventually declared non-deployable. The reason? In December I finally fixed my legally blind left eye and had LASIK surgery. Hoo-ray. Because of the impending surgery, I could not get the smallpox vaccination for fear the infection would spread -- after all, it is a live virus. And after the surgery, in order to ensure I was healing properly, I was technically non-deployable for 42 days. I could not be cleared to leave the country on military operations until those 42 days had expired. The 43rd day was today. I went to the SRC to get cleared to deploy, where I had this lovely exchange:

Me (officer): "Hey man I have this deployable sheet taken care of. Can you go ahead and sign me in so I can change that status?"

Soldier (enlisted): "Sorry dude. You gotta hit that line up over there if you need to be declared non-deployable."

Me (ignoring the fact a private just called me "dude"): "Yes, understood. But I am deployable. As you see on my sheet, I just need to get the smallpox vaccination and see the clinical guy so I can have my medical records updated."

Soldier: "Oh. Well go to station 9."

Me: "I just came from station 9. They said to come here."

Soldier: "Well, Rome wasn't built in a day"

Me: "..."

So I went to station 9 where they looked at me like I was a polar bear at a bbq. Apparently it was not station 9. Blame shifted quickly from the historically challenged Soldier to station 9 and to... me. Apparently I needed to fill out this form and complete this online survey and donate my kidney to science and then - maybe - I could be considered deployable. Summation: although I had in my possession a checklist of stations to go to, and although said checklist was complete save for two blocks which needed to be checked, and although those blocks were numbered, and there were massive numbers at each station which corresponded with the numbers on my sheet, no one had any idea who I needed to see or where I needed to go. And even though I said to the NCO in charge of the mess "I need to get the smallpox vaccination" he still heard "I need to get my hearing checked" and sent me in that direction.

There is a bigger issue here I think. We have sent Soldiers to Afghanistan since October 2001 and to Iraq since February 2003: a total of almost 17 years of deploying Soldiers. As we close the chapter of our nation's involvement in the War on Terror in Iraq, common sense tends to dictate that we should have deploying Soldiers down to a science. The fact that we don't, the fact that my experience is far too common among deploying and returning Soldiers, speaks to far more than success - or lack thereof - on the battlefield can. If we can't put people at the right place in the right uniform and at the right time, how can we expect our partners in the Iraqi and Afghan Armies to do the same? How can we be expected to adhere to guidelines and draw downs if, taking the SRC as a microcosm, they too are and ever-elusive and ever shifting target?

However misplaced his cliche might have been, that Private was onto something. Rome wasn't built in a day. But after 17 years I think they understood where the aqueducts were going. My brigade, a unit made up of more than four thousand Soldiers, still has been unable to give us even the most scant information, like when we'll leave, where we are headed to, and what our mission will be when we arrive. We will be an Advise and Assist Brigade. What does that mean? Who will we advise? How will we assist them? As we mop up the floors and get ready to put Iraq in its long-overdue place in our rear view mirror, what lessons will the Army - and, in a larger sense, the Department of Defense - take from our 8+ years there?